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THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION OF KOSOVO EUROPEANIZATION 
CONSEQUENCES: THE PAST AND THE PRESENT
Undergoing a myriad of regime changes, occupied by different empires and states throughout 
the history, Kosovo has never had a particular administrative experience. With the creation 
of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, where Kosovo gained its self-ruling 
autonomy status granted by the Constitution of 1974, the native Albanian majority were able 
to join the province administration structures. Nonetheless, with the breakup of Yugoslavia, 
and the forced supremacy of the autonomy imposed by Slobodan Milosevic with the new 
1989 Constitution, all Albanian employees in the administration were forcibly dismissed 
from their work places. The war in 1999 was succeeded with the launch of the United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the largest civilian mission at that time, with the task 
of building a new self-governing administration for the country. That was largely aided by 
the European Union and its programs of aid.
17 years after the war, the public administration in Kosovo is still regarded as 
unprofessional, partisan, politically dependent and corrupt. Where did the UN or EU fail?
In this paper, I will try to give an insight to the shifts of administrative powers in Kosovo 
since 1974, how did the administration developments occur in times of a communist 
Federation, the abolishment of these powers with the new Constitution imposed illegally 
by Slobodan Milosevic and the endeavors of UN to build up the first modern public 
administration in post war democratic Kosovo.
Further I will analyze the consequences of the sudden shift from a communist inherited 
practice to an EU standards public administration, as imposed by the Union itself as a 
pre-accession condition.
This, in itself has been identified as a major problem, taking into consideration the 
difficulties of implementation of such standards because of the legacy from the communist 
practice to a modern EU standard based administration.
I will prove that the reform as imposed by the EU especially, analyzing it through the 




I. Developments of the Public Administration from 1974-1989
Kosovo throughout its history has been under constant foreign rule, and had never a 
fully-fledged public administration to govern. The mere responsibilities in governing the 
administration were extended to the Autonomous Province of Kosovo with the Constitution 
of the Federative Socialistic Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) sponsored and adopted by 
Josip Broz Tito as its president.
The Constitution of 1974, has put Kosovo on the equal terms with all the other 
constitutive Republics, thus giving the province autonomous regulatory powers to self-
govern.1
This marked an era of rapid development on the province both culturally, politically, 
and sociologically. The Constitution of 1974 has allowed for Kosovo to even have its 
own Province Constitution2 that has been based on the provisions as well as freedoms and 
liberties as prescribed in the SFRJ Constitutional arrangements.
These provisions gave power to Kosovo to decide on its territorial integrity, stating that 
without the consent of the Province its borders cannot be changed, for the consent must 
be given by the Provinces Assembly.3
The provision can be interpreted as a clear administrative, political, and judicial power 
of the Kosovo’s institutions for self-governance4 and vast control over its territory, thus it 
represents the highest constitutional arrangement for Kosovo being equivalent to the other 
Republics, and deciding on the matters on its own, until the Declaration of Independence 
in 2008.
Below I will briefly describe the organizational arrangement of Kosovo until the 
supremacy of the its autonomy began by the increased nationalist sentiment of Slobodan 
Milosevic in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, in 1989, where Kosovo was stripped off 
from its self-governing powers and its autonomy abolished.
Kosovo between the periods of time 1974–1989 has had autonomy over the three crucial 
governing branches, the executive, the legislative and the judicial one.
The Constitution of the Kosovo Autonomous Province of 1974 has stipulated all the 
elements of self-rule and was equal to the other Constitutions of the Republics. It was 
the higher legislative act of Kosovo that governed the role of Provinces Assembly, the 
Council of Kosovo, the Kosovo Presidency, the Kosovo Executive Council, as well as other 
mechanisms such as the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the Public Prosecutor, 
placing the Assembly as the highest organ of power in the sense of duties and responsibilities 
of the Province.5
1 Ustav SFRJ iz 1974 (The Constitution of SFRJ from 1974). http://mojustav.rs/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/
Ustav-SFRJ-iz-1974.pdf (24.05.2017.)
2 Kushtetuta e Krahines Socialiste Autonome te Kosoves, adopted on 27 February 1974 by the Province Parliament. 
Ref.number: KK Nr. 010-08. Accessed at the Kosovo archives Official Gazette of the Socialist Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo. Nr. 4 published on 27 February 1974.
3 The Constitution of SFRJ from 1974. Art. 5, par. 3.
4 soós, EDit: New modes of governance. In: Robert Wiszniowski – Kamil Glinka (ed.): New public governance 
in the Visegrád Group (V4). Torun: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszalek, 2015. 44. p.
5 saliu, kurtesh. Lindja, zhvillimi, pozita dhe aspektet e autonomitetit të Krahinës Socialiste Autonome të 
Kosovë në Jugosllavinë socialiste. Enti i Teksteve, Prishtinë, 1984. 79. p.
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As per the administrative arrangements, the Province Assembly has had the veto power 
over the Constitutional amendments of the SFRJ Constitution and the Constitution of the 
Socialist Republic of Serbia, whereas the internal powers have envisaged adoption of 
provincial laws, budget, institutional arrangements, and any other administrative function 
as prescribed in the relevant legal documents.6
However, the Province of Kosovo just like Vojvodina which had the same equivalent 
status, did not have its own flag, coat of arms or anthem, like the other six constitutive 
Republics did.
The Constitution of SFRJ, article 2, did stipulate that the two Provinces are a constitutive 
part of the SFRJ, nonetheless within the auspice of the Socialist Republic of Serbia. This 
has subsequently caused series of actions that led to the 1999 bloodshed, with more than 
13 thousand civilians killed and more than 800.000. displaced according to the UNHCR 
official figures.
The breakup of Yugoslavia started with the 1989 changes of the Constitution. The 
Badinter Arbitration Committee, during the 90’s was convened by the European Community 
(EC) in order to address questions of secession for the Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Facing what was seen as inexorable dissolution 
of the SFRJ, the aforementioned Republics demanded recognition by the EC as sovereign 
states, whereas the Badinter Committee acknowledged their right for secession in delivering 
4 opinions by 14th of January 19917, but did not mention Kosovo, where the tensions were 
rising high. On March 23, 1989, the provincial assembly, a body that was established under 
the 1974 Constitution, met under siege of armored cars and tanks, where the changes of 
the Constitution were voted, restricting severely Kosovo’s powers, and enabling Serbia 
to take over the control of the Police, Courts and Civil Defense, matters of social and 
educational policy, power to issue administrative instructions as well as ultimately use of 
the language.8 It is important to mention that the meeting took place without the presence of 
the Albanian members of the Assembly. Both of these actions led to the escalation and the 
uprising of the Kosovo Albanians in response to the oppression exercised by the Milosevic 
regime, resulting in bloodshed, ethnic cleansing, atrocities and humanitarian catastrophe.
As it can be concluded from above, the fundaments of the Kosovo modern administration 
were laid out in 1974 Constitution. The majority Albanian population had self-governing 
rule over its inhabited territory, and exercised the administrative powers as the legislation 
in power provided. However, the breakup of Yugoslavia, and the forcible topple of the 
autonomy by Milosevic, that ultimately led to a violent conflict and the NATO intervention 
in Kosovo, put a break to the administrative memory of the Kosovo bureaucrats. The 
subsequent installation of the United Mission in Kosovo and the consequent actions after, 
will be an uncontested empiric argument about the failure of the international community 
to properly address the challenges of building a new and professional administration, which 
will be discussed in the following chapters.
6 saliu, 1984, 80. p.
7 pellet, allain: The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee A Second Breath for the Self-Determination 
of Peoples. Eur J Int Law. Vol. 3(1). 1992. 178-185. p.
8 malcolm, noel. Kosovo: A short history. Macmillan, London. 1998. 343. p.
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II. The UN-efficiency – they gave us freedom but no future
Responding to human rights violations and ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population 
in Kosovo, a US led and NATO backed up air strike campaign, named Operation Allied 
Forces was launched directed on the military and strategic targets of the Republic of Serbia 
which brought to the surrender of Serbia9 and ultimately on 9th of June, the subsequent 
agreement requested and confirmed the withdrawal of all armed and police forces of Serbia 
from Kosovo and the installation of the United Nation led Mission in Kosovo as well as 
the NATO controlled Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR).10
The liberation of Kosovo was succeeded with the Resolution 1244 of the United Nation 
Security Council (UNSC 1244), which did stipulate an installation of an international 
civilian UN mission (UNMIK) that will conduct tasks such as, organization and supervision 
of the provisional self-government institutions as well as the transition of powers to those 
institutions while mediating a political process which is aimed at determining a final status 
solution for Kosovo, taking into consideration the Rambouillet accords.11
Intervening into post conflict countries, since the end of the Cold War, has been an 
ambitious project for the international community which has strived to fundamentally 
reshape the societal landscape by building new state institutions, helping on the economic 
development and revival, as well as the support for other pillars of the state building 
architecture.
In Kosovo, this started with the adoption of the Constitutional Framework of the Republic 
of Kosovo, a quasi-constitution, which foresaw developing meaningful self-government 
pending a final settlement, and establishing provisional institutions of self-government 
in the legislative, executive, and judicial fields through the participation of the people of 
Kosovo in free and fair elections.12
The war and the killing during the 1998 and 1999 were succeeded by another 
extraordinary, not least difficult, experience for the Kosovars: a partisan regime that took 
the powers vested in them for granted. A work of many international organizations, with 
excessive amount of money, a continuous process of digging for a spark of hope with all 
the perils embedded in lawless and anarchic “free Kosovo”.
Since the abolition of the Autonomy, and especially during the war in 1999, there 
practically was no administration in Kosovo. The limited number of Kosovo Serbs that 
retained their offices especially in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Secret Services, 
fled the country upon the arrival of NATO forces and the UN administrators. The latter, 
being inexperienced and too bureaucratic from its top, i.e. the Security Council and the 
General Assembly, did not have the sufficient capacities to address all the needs in the 
post-conflict society.
9 KEr-linDsay, jaMEs: Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans. I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd. London, 
2009. 14-17. p.
10 Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia’. 9 June 1999. http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/
a990609a.htm (22.05.2017.)
11 UNSC Resolution 1244 – https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.
pdf?OpenElement (24.05.2017.)
12 “Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo” – signed on March 15, 2001. http://
www.assembly-kosova.org/common/doc, s/FrameworkPocket_ENG_Dec2002.pdf (24.05.2017.)
 101
The Public Administration of Kosovo Europeanization Consequences
Kosovo’s civil service just prior to the 2008 declaration of independence faced a lot 
of challenges, such as the extent legacy from the past communist regime in exercise 
of duties, lack of legislative modernization, working conditions and human resources, 
corruption, appointments made on the basis of seniority, political convictions and patronage 
and ultimately inadequate skills.
Nonetheless, UNMIK did establish a form of administration that reactive to the processes 
ahead was divided in three periods, the first one being immediately after the war where 
Kosovo actors mainly the leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army that formed the Democratic 
Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) led by Ibrahim 
Rugova had only consultative role. This followed by the second phase in 2000 where the 
Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) was created by UNMIK where different 
departments had the civil administration role and the heads of these departments were a 
Kosovo national and an international administrator. After the adoption of the Constitutional 
Framework of Kosovo in 2001 the local Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) 
were created.13
This setup lasted until the Declaration of Independence in 2008, albeit gradual transfer 
of responsibilities did occur, nonetheless UNMIK was still holding the decision-making 
powers that superseded the authority both of the PISG and the Kosovo Parliament.
Joshi and Mason claim that 48 percent of the 125 civil wars that occurred in seventy-
one countries between 1945 and 2005 resurged again14 in the context of international 
administration failure which Skendaj puts it from the theoretical analysis of the international 
community involved in state-building exercises in Kosovo and elsewhere.15
UNMIK has failed in so many prerogatives. Primarily designed as an interim 
administration, did not have the qualifications to quickly setup a non-partisan administration, 
and transfer the powers to the national elected authorities. It lacked an exit strategy while 
struggling to remain politically correct on both ends, with Serbia and with the Kosovo 
interlocutors which pushed the status quo of Kosovo all the way to the outbreak of violence 
in 2004.
Instead of concentrating on the low level of administrative reform and training, UNMIK 
was designed to rule, rather than transfer the know-how.
A lack of local knowledge about and sensitivity to the local context also explains the 
difficulties that international organizations face when they attempt to build democracy 
and state bureaucracies.16
Drawing from conclusions from the Mission in Kosovo, it should have been more 
vigilant 5 years later when it established the Mission in East Timor – where it did fail again.
13 Weller, Mark: Contested statehood: The international administration of the Kosovo’s struggle for independence. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009. 301-302. p.
14 joshi, MaDhav – t. DaviD Mason: Civil War Settlements, Size of Governing Coalition, and Durability of 
Peace in Post–Civil War States. International Interactions, Vol. 37 (4). 2011. 389. p.
15 sKEnDaj, Elton: Creating Kosovo: International Oversight and the Making of Ethical Institutions. Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press. 2014. 6. p.
16 sKEnDaj 2014, 8. p.
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III. European Union takeover of inducing reform – the sticks and carrots
The inconsistency of the UNMIK mission, flawed by its bureaucratic mechanisms and 
procedures forced it to request that Kosovo being in the middle of the European continent, 
should be treated as a European problem, thus the EU must take over the responsibilities 
in the further developments.
Immediately after the coordinated Declaration of Independence, on February 17, 2008 
by the Kosovo Parliament, the newest Republic was recognized by the majority of the EU 
member states, USA, Japan, Norway, Turkey and a number of the rest of the democratic 
world.
A difficult task hailed upon the EU – to help build a state that has little or no administrative 
memory, burdened by incapacity and overwhelming corruption, moreover to reflect on the 
pledge given in the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit that the future of the Western Balkans lies 
within the Union.17
The EU Progress Report in 2008 was very clear and concise in its assessment. The review 
that started in April 2007, showed serious flaws inherited from the pre-independence period.
Civil servants continue to be vulnerable to political interference, corruption, and 
nepotism. Overall, despite some progress related to the adoption of an action plan and some 
legislation, public administration reform still needs to be implemented. Public administration 
and the coordination capacity of public bodies in Kosovo continue to be weak. Ensuring 
the delivery of public services to all people in Kosovo and establishing a professional, 
accountable, accessible, and representative public administration is a key priority in the 
European Partnership for Kosovo.18
Having this in mind, the EU has been engaged in Kosovo through multiple mechanisms 
such as the IPA funds and other mechanisms and projects to be elaborated more below. 
Other organization such as UNDP have extensively been engaged in Kosovo through their 
projects for the reform of the Public Administration the latest being The Support to Public 
Administration Reform project provides high-level policy advice to the Ministry of Public 
Administration on the process of developing policies and legal instruments which support 
the implementation of PAR as a technical process worth 1.5 million dollars.19
As per the EU, since 1999, the European Agency for Reconstruction, a body established 
for the purpose of postwar reconstruction by the European Commission, in 1999 did pledge 
the support of 500-700 million EUR per year per Kosovo in the course of the following 
three years. Only in 1999, the European Commission allocated 150 million EUR from its 
annual budget for immediate needs for Kosovo.20
17 Declaration of the EU after the Eu-Western Balkans Summit. Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003. C/03/163. 10229/03 
(Presse 163) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm (24.05.2017.)
18 Commission staff working document. Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244/99) 2008 Progress Report accompanying 
the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Enlargement Strategy 
and Main Challenges 2008-2009. COM(2008) 674. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/
near/files/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/kosovo_progress_report_en.pdf (23.05.2017.)
19 Summary of the UNDP project Support to Public Administration Reform. http://www.ks.undp.org/content/
kosovo/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance/PAR.html (24.05.2017.)
20 European Agency for Reconstruction set up for Kosovo. Brussels, 23 June 1999. Press release number: 
IP/99/411. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-99-411_en.htm (24.05.2017.)
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In total Kosovo has received more than €2.3 billion in EU assistance since 1999, while 
it initially focused on emergency relief actions and reconstruction, it now concentrates 
on promoting Kosovo’s institutions, sustainable economic development and Kosovo’s 
European future.21
Once the Declaration of Independence was read, and Kosovo became the newest state 
in the world the EU concentrated onto a series of projects and ventured towards a more 
institutional approach. The clear EU perspective yielded by both EU officials and Kosovo 
political representatives, had the European Commission engage in drawing different projects 
within the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) that will benefit Kosovo in its administrative 
alignment to the EU Acquis and fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria Plus22.
Insofar, the IPA funds dedicated to the fulfilment of the political and economic criteria, 
the European Standards and the support activities, from 2007 to 2013 reach the figure of 
672.3 million EUR, while the projected cost for the 2014-2020 projects is 645.5 million 
EUR. (See the tables below).23
Kosovo 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total2007–2013
Total IPA funds granted to 
Kosovo 68.3 184.7 106.1 67.3 68.7 70.0 107.2 672.3
Reforms in preparation 
for EU approximation: 
Democracy and governance
13 23 18.5 19.8 74.3
1. Instrument for pre-accession (IPA) funds distributed to Kosovo in the 2007-2013 period. Source: 
European External Action Service. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/1387/kosovo-and-eu_
en#Technical+and+financial+cooperation (24.05.2017)
Kosovo 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018–2020 Total2014–2020
Reforms in preparation for 
EU approximation 37.3 34.0 31.0 35.2 99.1 236.6
Democracy and governance 64.4 46.0 110.4
Rule of law and fundamental 
rights 73.1 53.1 126.2
2. Instrument for pre-accession (IPA) funds distributed and planned for Kosovo in the 2014-2020 period for 
reform of the Public Administration and the Rule of Law Reform. Source: European Neighborhood Policy and 
Enlargement. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/funding-by-country/kosovo_en 
(24.05.2017)
21 Kosovo and the EU - An overview of relations between the EU and Kosovo. 12.05.2016.
 https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/1387/kosovo-and-eu_en#Technical+and+financial+cooperation 
(24.05.2017.)
22 The “Plus” is added because apart from the Copenhagen Criterions as established by the EU member states 
as precondition for accession, Kosovo has the additional reform of the public administration and the political 
dialogue with Belgrade added to it. The European Council Conclusion of 1993 in Copenhagen, referred to as 
the “Copenhagen Criteria” http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-93-3_en.htm?locale=en (24.05.2017.)




With all the money poured in project implementation for the modernization of the public 
administration, the EU regardless has constantly echoed in its progress report the weak 
and corrupt public administration that needs a thorough reform. In its 2016 report, the first 
after the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the EU and the 
Republic of Kosovo, the Commission has again like in the previous years addressed the 
need to address the Commission’s recommendations in the area of accountability. According 
to the Report, non-merit-based recruitment continues to adversely affect effectiveness, 
efficiency, and professional independence of public administration.24
Did the EU fail in its role? More than 1.2 billion EUR given for the reform of the 
public administration in different projects, nonetheless the Progress Reports released by 
the same EU body that finances these projects identifies serious flaws and lag of reform. 
All this combined with the lack of political willingness to implement the myriad of laws 
and regulations especially pertaining to the civil service, exhibits a clear contradiction on 
the EU’s role in Kosovo. They pay for the reform, yet every year no words are spared to 
criticize its functionality. In a theoretical approach of the Europeanization process, the 
transformative powers of EU as explained by Boerzel are seriously undermined in the cases 
of limited statehood which is one of the main causes of ineffective implementation of the 
EU induced reform especially when talking about the public administration.25
In the case of Kosovo, a deeper analysis is needed, since it represents a sui-generis case 
of international administration and oversight for more than 13 years, in which the EU for 
the majority of the time period served as a padron.
IV. Brief overview on the legal framework of Kosovo – but it lacks 
implementation
On paper, Kosovo has numerous laws, strategies and directives that have been put in place 
to please the appetite of the EU decision makers. The structure that will be listed below, will 
show that in paper Kosovo has an up to date and well aligned with EU’s interest legislation. 
The glitch is found in its implementation and the notion of how the administration is 
perceived by the political forces in the country.
The core of the Public Administration lies in the Law for Civil Service which regulates 
the status of the civil servants as well as their relations with the administration, being that 
on a central or local level, different Agencies executive and independent ones.26 It represents 
the core of the institutional mechanisms for how the public administration works, including 
the ethics, disciplinary measures, appointments as well as duties and responsibilities.
Adjunct to the core Law on Civil Service is the Law on the Salaries of Civil Service 
as well as numerous directives and regulations as sublegal acts that individually regulate 
a broad range of issues regarding the civil service.
 Urged by the need to address the findings of the Progress Reports and the continuous 
criticism, the Ministry of Public Administration, did adopt two core strategies the Strategy 
24 Kosovo 2016 Report. Brussels, 9.11.2016. SWD(2016) 363 final. Commission staff working document.
25 Borzel, Tanja A.: When Europeanization hits limited statehood: the Western Balkans as a test case for the 
transformative power of Europe. KFG Working Papers Series, No. 30. 2011. Freie Universitat Berlin.10. p.
26 Law Nr. 03/L-149 for the Civil Service of the Reupublic of Kosovo, Art. 1., par.2.
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for the Reform of Public Administration 2010-2013 and the Strategy for the Modernization 
of the Public Administration 2015-2020, the latter financed by OECD/SIGMA.
The problem with the Public Administration in Kosovo lies not on paper, but as said 
on its implementation. The laws and strategies do proclaim the very democratic spirit that 
the EU instills. Nonetheless, bringing the recommendations in practice requires political 
willingness, which is rather costly both economically and politically.
V. Conclusion
Nobody has had the illusion that Europeanization is a smooth and calm process. It is 
costly and needs to have a firm determination on both ends, the national authorities i.e. 
the Government of Kosovo, and the EU.
The public administration in Kosovo is a large one, and saying “large” is being humble 
in the characterization. The best possible illustration for the major problems that it faces, 
is when the General Auditor in the 2011 Report, has found in the Ministry of Justice the 
absurdity of a position classified as a “senior officer for photocopies”.
These cases substantiate by far the claims of Boerzel about the impossibility of the full 
application of reforms by states with limited statehood. Claims that robust reforms towards 
the Europeanization in this case of the public administration do bare political cost for the 
Government that is seen as a potential risk of losing public support27, do reflect the fact 
that the Administration in Kosovo has been seen as a safe haven for the political parties to 
comfort their members and relatives, something that not only the EU as a whole but also 
member states individually have constantly been criticizing the Government for.
However, what was the value added to the 1.2 billion EUR donated by the European 
Union a portion of which is designed specifically for reforming and modernizing the public 
administration? The Europeanization in its strict definition as prescribed by Radaelli as 
a set of norms, beliefs and values that are taken on the EU level and implemented on the 
national level, in the case of Kosovo if we measure it with the “goodness of fit”, it can be 
clearly seen that it steps on hurdles along the way.
Firstly, Kosovo has not had any institutional memory. The only experience it can 
draw is from the communist period in the SFRJ. Many of the institutional members from 
that period are either retired or don’t have any desire to adopt to the rapid changes of the 
modern administration. The transfer from the old to the new and modern administration 
happened in Kosovo rapidly, started with UNMIK and it goes on with the European Union, 
thus the adaptation period of those who have had any experience in the state bureaucracy 
proved to be insufficient.
Secondly, Kosovo has more than 91.000 employees in the public sector in 21 Ministries, 
with over 70 subordinate bodies in the Office of the Prime Minister and 34 other institutions 
established by the Kosovo Parliament.28 These institutions have been seen by the Governing 
political parties as a mechanism to please its constituents, political affiliates and groups 
27 Borzel, 2011. 9. p.
28 Reforming Public Administration in Kosovo: a proposal to decrease the number of employees in the public 
administration. GAP Institute Policy Brief. July 2015. http://www.institutigap.org/documents/99892_
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of interest closely linked with the major political parties. This has been echoed by various 
analysis and think-tanks as well as foreign diplomats accredited in Kosovo.
While the consequence of this particular negative trend can be argued only upon the 
lack of political will and the high cost of reform, I see it as a legacy from the not so long 
ago past time.
Immediately after the war mainly the educated youth were attracted to work for one of 
the hundreds of international organizations operating in Kosovo. They would benefit from 
a very high salary, at least five times higher than the current average salary in Kosovo, in 
addition to other benefits. This opened the market for the less competent staff to engage in 
the public sector established in the form of Departments in times of UNMIK, where salaries 
and benefit packages were less than attractive – and at that time, no one paid attention to it.
The European Union in its reform induction should take into consideration many 
prerogatives. Europeanization cannot be seen as “tailored to fit all” model, without careful 
analysis of the social, historical and political construct of the prospective countries wishing 
to join the EU, including Kosovo.
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